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Abstract
Government interventions to support the financial institutions fall into two broad categories:
direct interventions (which immediately increase the government’s financing need) and off-
balance sheet contingent guarantees (which have no immediate impact on debt but will
add to government debt as and when a loss materializes). If financial sector losses are
independent of sovereign’s own risk, all else being equal, they must have the same effect on
the sovereign’s risk profile, even though they impact the government balance sheet differently.
In this paper, we study the nature and effectiveness of a government’s interventions on its
own risk profile. Our findings suggest that direct assistance has a significantly large effect
on sovereign risk, while the effect of contingent guarantees is statistically not significant,
being significant only for the euro area founders. Controlling for government interventions,
we also find that GDP, perceived government effectiveness, economic sentiment, size of the
financial sector, and membership of the euro area reduce the sovereign risk, while asset
concentration within financial sector, unemployment and inflation have an adverse effect.
Our findings support Bresciani and Cossaro (2016)’s claim that during the sovereign debt
crisis, governments undertook complex financial operations to change the composition of
their interventions towards contingent guarantees.
Keywords: sovereign risk, financial assistance, fiscal capacity, bailout, contingent
guarantee
JEL: G01, H63
1. Introduction
In a severe financial crisis, countries need sufficient financial resources to support their
financial system (see Tagkalakis (2012), Maurer and Grussenmeyer (2015), Millaruelo and
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +34 934020113; Fax: +34 934039082
Departament d’Economia, Universitat de Barcelona, Diagonal 696, Barcelona 08034, Spain.
del R´ıo (2017)). The potential fiscal costs depend on the structure of the financial system1
and may be unevenly distributed.2 Hu¨ttl and Schoenmaker (2016) estimated that for the
euro area, the recapitalization of banks may cost anywhere between 4 and 12% of GDP
for different countries. In a systemic crisis, the bail-in of private investors will not be fully
possible and even the fiscal resources of some countries might be insufficient (see Sgherri and
Zoli (2009), Correa et al. (2014)). The sovereign will then require outside support which
will further add to the macroeconomic instability.
During the recent European sovereign debt crisis (2009-12), most countries realized that
the bail-in of private investors was insufficient. The financial sector needed external as-
sistance and most countries bore this cost at least partially. Since then, a sizable volume
of public resources has been committed to stabilizing and restructuring the financial sys-
tem (see Millaruelo and del R´ıo (2017) for detailed description). According to information
available at the European Commission’s (EC) Directorate General for Competition website
(Table 1), the total amount of state aid used by the EU-28 countries between 2008 and 2015
was estimated at a value of roughly 1.95 trillion euros (465.6 billion for recapitalizations,
188.6 billion for impaired assets, 105 billion for liquidity support and 1188.1 billion in the
form of guarantees).3
Table 1: Total amount of state aid approved and used, EU-28 (2008-2015)
Amount Approved Amount Used
Aid instruments EUR billion % 2015 EU GDP EUR billion % 2015 EU GDP
Recapitalization 820.9 5.6% 465.6 3.2%
Impaired asset measures 604.3 4.1% 188.6 1.3%
Liquidity support 229.7 1.6% 105 0.7%
Guarantees on liabilities 3311.2 22.6% 1188.1 8.1%
Note: Amount of aid approved and used are the maximum outstanding amounts (annual) during the
period 2008-2015. Source: European Commission.
However, not all state aid has an equal and immediate impact on the country’s fiscal
situation. A distinction must be drawn between direct loans to financial institutions, recap-
italization and asset restructuring measures with respect to the contingent guarantees. The
first three require an immediate disbursement of funds and therefore increase the sovereign’s
borrowing requirement immediately.4 On the other hand, the granting of public guaran-
tees is considered as a contingent liability with no impact on the deficit or debt, unless the
1Langfield and Pagano (2016) documents the adverse effects of the bank-based financial structure devel-
oped in Europe and the resulting impact on systemic risk and economic growth.
2It depends on a multitude of factors like the size of the financial sector, the asset concentration within
banks and the composition of public and private debt, among others.
3Source: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state aid/scoreboard/index en.html
4An increase in the borrowing requirement does not automatically translate into losses. Think of loans.
These are financial transactions, which adds to both sides (assets and liabilities) of the general government
balance sheet. Also, it will add to the government losses only when the reference entity defaults on its
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guarantee is realized and the government has to make a payment or assume a debt. In the
meantime, they are a source of funds via the attendant commission fees. Experience also
suggests that during a severe financial crisis, governments undertake complex financial op-
erations to change the composition of their interventions towards contingent guarantees (see
Bresciani and Cossaro (2016)). Assuming the difficulty in raising capital in a severe crisis,
this helps cushion the impact of the financial crisis on the sovereign’s own creditworthiness.
This paper studies the impact of government intervention on sovereign risk based on the
type of instrument used to support the financial institutions during the ongoing financial and
sovereign debt crisis. We classify the financial assistance measures into two broad categories:
(1) Direct assistance (support measures that increased the government’s financing require-
ment immediately) and (2) Contingent guarantee (support that will increase the financing
requirement over time as and when the loss materializes). Given a choice between direct
assistance or contingent guarantee, we aim to understand the financial benefit of using one
against the other by quantifying their impact on sovereign risk.5As pointed out by Hu¨ttl and
Schoenmaker (2016), if the divergence in financing conditions across the banking union is
actually reflecting the strength of fiscal backstops in different countries and fiscal resources
are limited, it might be a good idea to think of ways to employ the fiscal resources prudently
(see Bova et al. (2016)).
Given that the public interventions in the banking sector proved to be an important
channel feeding the negative spillovers between banks’ and sovereign’s stability, even when
the banks did not hold sovereign bonds (see Leonello (2017)), we ask the following questions:
(1) Is an increase in the level of financial assistance always associated with an increase in
sovereign risk?; and (2) Does the design of public interventions have implications for the
stabilization of sovereign risk?
The analysis in the paper provides a number of novel results about the effect of gov-
ernment support on the sovereign risk profile. First, even though both forms of financial
assistance (direct assistance and contingent guarantee) are temporary in nature, direct as-
sistance is significantly more expensive. This is so because the provision of direct assistance
requires immediate disbursement of the resources available to the government, which in turn
are determined by the sovereign’s current risk profile. In times of crisis, if a large amount
needs to be transferred to the banking sector while the government’s fiscal space is limited,
the direct intervention will have a direct detrimental effect on the sovereign’s solvency.
repayment obligations. For recapitalization and impaired asset measures, depending on their characteristics
and conditions, they may be considered either as a financial investment, as a capital transfer, or as a
combination of both. If what is involved is a financial investment, they will give rise to an increase in
financial assets on the general government balance sheet, whereas when they are a capital transfer covering
cumulative losses (or above market value transaction), this will entail a direct loss for the government for
the related period. The subsequent sale of the asset or of the capital holdings at a lower price than that at
which they were acquired will generate losses, while if it is sold at a higher price, it may be profitable for
the government.
5Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) provide empirical evidence whether the design of crisis containment and
resolution policies can systematically influence the overall magnitude of fiscal costs. However, we differ and
try to estimate the effect based on the type of financial assistance measure without taking view on the
underlying policy objective.
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Second, the contingent guarantee does not significantly affect the sovereign risk. This
result is counter-intuitive and against the findings of Arslanalp and Liao (2014). By im-
proving banks’ available resources, guarantees have a direct beneficial effect on financial
stability. However, by increasing the sovereign’s contingent liability, they must have a di-
rect detrimental effect on sovereign solvency. One possible explanation is that guarantees
indirectly affect each probability, because the likelihood of a banking crisis and that of a
sovereign default affect one another. As pointed out by Leonello (2017), by reducing the
probability of a banking crisis, guarantees reduce the instances in which the government
transfers resources to the banking sector, thus improving sovereign stability. Overall, the
analysis suggests that policies addressing the design of financial intervention schemes and
their funding are important for limiting the sovereign’s own fragility.
The novelty of the paper is the empirical analysis of the effects of different components
of financial assistance measures in a context in which the government can choose between
direct intervention and contingent guarantee. Since the government’s budget is limited
and both banks and the government are fragile, it is of utmost importance to address the
financial assistance design and its funding while limiting the impact on the sovereign’s own
risk. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical paper to provides counter-evidence to the
assumption in public interventions in banking that all sovereign interventions - direct or
contingent - have a similar impact on the sovereign’s risk profile. It also provides support
to the argument that credibility and effectiveness of the guarantees are intertwined with the
sovereign funding risk (see Ko¨nig et al. (2014), Leonello (2017)).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the various financial
instruments that were used in the recent crisis. A comparison of the direct cost associated
with these measures and their contribution to increasing government debt is also discussed.
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 analyzes the effect of the different measures on
sovereign risk to determine which ones the government should use, given a choice between
contingent guarantee and direct assistance. Section 5 examines a number of robustness
exercises. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Government interventions
During the recent financial crisis, governments across the globe undertook complicated
and substantial financial operations to support distressed financial institutions. However, a
closer look at the underlying economic dynamics of these interventions suggests that they can
be classified into two broad categories. In the majority of these transactions, the troubled
asset moved from the books of financial institutions to the balance sheet of the sovereign. In
order to facilitate this transaction, the sovereign used cash, issued debt or liquidated some
other asset holding. For the rest, the sovereign provided a fiscal backstop in the form of
contingent guarantee in return for a fee, while the troubled asset still lay in the books of the
financial institutions. Figure 1 summarizes these differences in chart form.
To highlight and contrast the differences between these assistance measures, let us look at
the direct assistance mechanism. Imagine at time t = 0, a government decision to interfere
in the financial market to corner a particular asset class - what we could call a troubled
4
Figure 1: Direct assistance vs Contingent guarantee
Financial Institution 
Capital Market 
Debt securities 
Cash 
Troubled assets 
Cash 
Government 
Contingent guarantee 
Fees 
Financial Institution 
Troubled assets 
(a) Targeted interventions 
(b) Contingent guarantees 
Government 
asset. Assume that the sovereign issued treasury securities to finance this transaction.
The proceeds of the debt sold will be transferred to the financial institution in return for
the troubled asset. Going forward, the sovereign will receive a stream of income from the
troubled assets it acquired (ia,t)
6 and will pay interest on the newly issued debt (is,t). Figure
2 shows this graphically. The blue and red lines represent the cash flows from the sovereign
debt and troubled assets respectively. The sovereign will have to finance the acquisition of
asset at t = 0 and the difference (is,t − ia,t) at all future times (t ≥ 1). The underlying
assumption behind this bailout strategy is that the cost of sovereign debt (is,t) will be
lower than the cost of capital for the financial institutions and the sovereign has excess
fiscal space; therefore the financial institution will be stabilized. On the other hand, if the
sovereign decides not to buy the asset but instead provide the contingent guarantee, the
payout for the sovereign will be the difference E(ia,t)− ia,t for all t ≥ 1, where E(ia,t) is the
income expected from the troubled asset.
Note that when the sovereign decides to buy the assets, the acquisition will cost it an
extra amount, which is the cost of borrowing for the sovereign (is,t). This additional amount
6This will be a dividend if the troubled asset is equity, and interest plus principle receivable in the case
of debt or loans.
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Figure 2: Sovereign bailout of financial institution: Cash flow structure
Sovereign 
Capital Markets 
Financial Institution 
is,1 is,2 is,3 is,t 
ia,1 ia,2 ia,3 ia,t 
Treasury 
Security Cash 
Cash 
Troubled 
Asset 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 time 
is over and above the direct losses that will materialize because of the non-performance of
the asset acquired (E(ia,t) − ia,t). This cost has to be paid regularly and will be borne by
the sovereign till either debt is repaid or the acquired assets are sold. So the asset which is
directly acquired has to outperform (i.e., offer a higher interest rate) the cost of sovereign
debt as long as it is on the sovereign’s balance sheet; otherwise, the sovereign is paying
interest while not receiving anything from the acquired asset or might suffer multiple losses
- paying interest on the borrowed fund and suffering losses on the acquired assets.
On the other hand, the contingent guarantee will earn a guarantee fee before the actual
loss materializes. So the resultant loss will be lower than or equal to (E(ia,t) − ia,t). This
can help the sovereign buy some time before accepting the loss in times of crisis. Also, even
if it materializes, the sovereign only has to bear the defaulted amount (a small fraction of
the whole amount) and it will be distributed across time. This is especially relevant in the
time of sovereign crisis, as the cost of raising debt is high and the sovereign can enter the
vicious spiral in which increasing amount and cost of debt can translate into insolvency.
Table 2 provides a summary of the various interventions and their classification in direct
versus contingent assistance. Appendix A explains each component in greater details.
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Table 2: Nature of governments’ financial sector assistance measure
Financial assistance measure Impact on general government’s
financing requirement
Direct assistance
1. Capital injections supporting financial institutions Up
2. Acquisition of equities (at or above market price) Up
- Dividends receivable: Indirect revenue Down
- Subsequent sales of shares: Capital recovery Down
3. Acquisition of other debt securities Up
- Interest receivable: Indirect revenue Down
4. Provision of loans Up
- Interest receivable: Indirect revenue Down
5. Debt assumptions Up
- Interest payable: Capital transfer Up
6. Assets and liabilities of newly created government defeasance struc-
tures (bad banks)
Up
7. Other assets and liabilities from entities reclassified from other sector
to general government without transactions
None
Contingent guarantees
1. Guarantee on assets or liabilities outside general government None
- Guarantee fees: Indirect revenue Down
- Called government guarantees: Capital transfer Up
2. Guarantee on securities issued under liquidity schemes None
3. Guarantee on Special purpose entities None
Note: Special purpose entities included here are those where the government has a significant role,
including a guarantee, but which are classified outside the general government sector. Their liabilities are
recorded outside the general government sector as contingent liabilities of the general government. Source:
Eurostat - Supplementary tables for reporting government interventions to support financial institutions.
3. Data
The main sample includes 23 European countries over the period 2007 to 2016. It includes
all countries for which consecutive data on government interventions to support financial
institutions are available. Table 3 provides an overview of our sample. The rest of the
section describes the data in more detail.
3.1. Sovereign risk measure (SovYield)
We use the benchmark ten-year long-term interest rates as our dependent variable to
measure the sovereign risk. These are the rates used as a convergence criterion to adopt
the euro, based on the Maastricht Treaty. The rates are based on the yield of ten-year
government bonds traded in the secondary market, gross of tax, and denominated in na-
tional currencies. All the yields are expressed in percentages per annum and are at annual
7
Table 3: Overview of country sample
Zone Countries # countries
Peripheral euro area Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain 5
Central euro area Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands
7
Rest of EA19 Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia 4
Others Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary,
Sweden, United Kingdom
7
Total 23
frequency.7 Figure 3 shows the mean and variation in sovereign yield for our sample using
a box plot.
Figure 3: Long term interest rates for EU countries
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3.2. Government support measures
For the government support measures, we use the rich new dataset created by the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB) Working Group on Government Finance Statistics
7For further details, refer to http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/irt lt mcby esms.htm
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have provided the European Central Bank (ECB) with information on the financial in-
terventions taken by their respective governments to stabilize the financial markets. This
categorizes the variety of policymakers’ fiscal responses to the crisis and offers the potential
to estimate the effects of government interventions with more precision and with a better
understanding of how the effects depend on the particular context.
Data on government support measures are collected from Eurostat. This data is available
in the public domain since it is mandatory for national statisticians to inform the wider public
of the direct fiscal impact of the bailout measures (decision by Eurostat in July 2009).
Figure 4 documents the cumulative net financial cost incurred by the European govern-
ments from the financial interventions to support financial institutions between 2007 and
2016 (both included). Most governments started providing financial assistance in 2008 (with
the exception of the UK, where the government provided financial assistance in 2007 as well),
while they suffered the worst losses between 2009 and 2013. The eastern European countries
are latecomers to the crisis and their governments incurred major losses in 2014-15.
Figure 4: Cumulative realized cost of financial assistance - 2007:2016
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Note: The y-axis represents the direct cost in terms of 2008 GDP at market price for individual countries.
Source: Eurostat. This data are presented at a yearly frequency from 2007 onwards for all EU28 countries.
For a detailed breakdown of the data, see the compilation guide which is also available at the Eurostat
website.
Ireland, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal incurred the highest cost at 24.85%,
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14.15%, 11.35%, 10.07% and 7.21% of their 2008 GDP (at market price) respectively. On
the other hand, France, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden earned a small revenue from
their financial assistance.8 Six out of the top seven countries with the highest costs (Ireland,
Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain) needed external assistance from the IMF
and the EU. Austria, Latvia, Bulgaria, Germany, and Lithuania also incurred net fiscal costs
more than one percent of their GDP. On average, the countries suffered net losses of roughly
4% of their 2008 GDP (at market price) for their financial intervention.
Table 4 documents the maximum losses incurred by a particular country in a given year
between 2007 and 2016. As can be seen, Ireland, Greece, Slovenia, and Cyprus suffered
massive losses of 21.21%, 10.76%, 10.13% and 8.91% of yearly GDP in 2010, 2013, 2013 and
2014 respectively. Spain (2012), Portugal (2014), Latvia (2010) and Lithuania (2011) also
suffered more than 2% of their yearly GDP in one particular year. Germany, Austria, and
Bulgaria also suffered considerable losses at the peak of the crisis.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of government’s yearly and cumulative financial cost to-
gether with the sovereign yield for selected countries. The bar represents the cumulative
fiscal cost measure in 2008 GDP (at market price) terms. The solid black line represents the
yearly cost in nominal terms while the broken red line represents the long-term interest rate.
for convenience, only six countries have been plotted. Readers interested in other countries
in our sample should refer to the online appendix at the author’s website.
As can be seen, the cost of government intervention varies drastically across countries and
across the year. For Spain, Germany and the UK, the cumulative cost is around 4.2%, 1.6%
and 0.8% of GDP respectively. For Spain, the financial cost was highest in 2012, at roughly
3.6% of 2008 GDP. For Germany, the financial cost was highest in 2010 at roughly 1.5%
of GDP. Also notable is the fact that for some countries the net financial cost is positive.
This is because the value of their financial asset holdings has increased over time or the
guarantees they promised did not materialize but they collected the fees.
The sovereign yield in crisis-hit countries follows a very different path from the rest of
the countries. For peripheral euro area countries, we see rising sovereign yield till 2012 and
then a sudden reversal with the implementation of Outright Monetary Transaction program
by the ECB. The pattern is repeated for Eastern European countries with a 2-3 year lag.
For the rest of the countries, we see a continuous drop in sovereign yield across countries.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of total government liability (sum of gross debt and con-
tingent guarantees) with the sovereign yield for selected countries. The red line represents
total government liability (gross debt plus contingent guarantees) as % of GDP while the
blue line represents the long-term interest rate.9 As can be seen, total government liability
has increased in almost all countries. In some countries, it has more than doubled since the
onset of the global financial crisis, while in others, the change is relatively modest.
8This is because the value of their financial asset holdings has increased over time or the guarantees they
promised did not materialize, but they collected the fees.
9For convenience, only six countries have been plotted. Readers interested in other countries in our
sample should refer to the online appendix at the author’s website.
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Table 4: Summary of net cost of financial assistance (2007:2016)
Country Average SD Maximum (Year) 2nd Highest (Year) 3rd Highest (Year) Start Year
Greece 1.53 3.47 10.76 (2013) 2.80 (2012) 2.76 (2015) 2009
Ireland 2.74 6.62 21.21 (2010) 3.71 (2011) 2.21 (2009) 2009
Italy 0.02 0.06 0.20 (2015) 0.01 (2013) 0.01 (2012) 2009
Portugal 0.73 0.94 2.95 (2014) 1.57 (2015) 1.23 (2010) 2008
Spain 0.46 1.14 3.68 (2012) 0.33 (2011) 0.32 (2013) 2008
Austria 0.43 0.51 1.60 (2014) 0.92 (2009) 0.64 (2015) 2008
Belgium 0.05 0.20 0.58 (2012) 0.06 (2016) 0.06 (2011) 2008
France -0.01 0.05 0.11 (2012) 0.0020 (2016) 0.0008 (2015) 2008
Germany 0.16 0.40 1.28 (2010) 0.12 (2009) 0.12 (2008) 2008
Luxembourg -0.04 0.10 0.19 (2009) 0.05 (2008) 0.01 (2013) 2008
Netherlands 0.07 0.13 0.37 (2009) 0.18 (2013) 0.17 (2010) 2008
Bulgaria 0.19 0.54 1.73 (2014) 0.21 (2015) - 2014
Croatia 0.04 0.06 0.16 (2015) 0.14 (2010) 0.07 (2012) 2010
Cyprus 1.09 2.79 8.91 (2014) 1.38 (2015) 0.47 (2016) 2009
Hungary 0.01 0.03 0.10 (2016) - - 2009
Latvia 0.42 0.72 2.26 (2010) 0.98 (2009) 0.46 (2012) 2008
Lithuania 0.15 1.06 2.84 (2011) 0.50 (2013) 0.12 (2012) 2010
Slovenia 1.46 3.11 10.13 (2013) 1.79 (2014) 1.29 (2015) 2009
Denmark -0.06 0.10 0.07 (2011) - - 2008
Sweden -0.02 0.03 0.0004 (2008) - - 2008
United Kingdom 0.07 0.18 0.47 (2009) 0.28 (2008) 0.07 (2013) 2007
3.2.1. Direct assistance (DirectAssistance)
We consider all outstanding amount of actual liabilities of the general government which
are reported as part of government intervention to support financial institutions as direct as-
sistance. This measures the increase in liabilities arising from the government interventions
to support financial institutions which are not contingent in nature. Apart from cases of di-
rect borrowing, by convention, for the liabilities entries, it also accounts for the direct impact
on government debt from activities which imply a transfer of cash from the government (e.g.,
transfer of cash relating to capital injections, loans granted, purchase of financial assets).
Imputed financing costs are also included. In addition, liabilities not financed through a
dedicated instrument (‘indirect liabilities’, i.e., liabilities deemed to be financed through the
general financing policy of government) are also included. All liabilities are part of direct
assistance as long as the corresponding asset (assumed to be financed by it) is held by a
government unit. However, borrowing (with the intention to finance a support operation) in
a financial period prior to the one when the operation actually takes place is not part of the
targeted intervention before the actual support operation took place. Table 5 documents
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Figure 5: Yearly and cumulative realized cost of government interventions vs long term interest rate for
selected countries - 2007:2016
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(b) Spain
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(f) United Kingdom
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The bar represents the cumulative fiscal cost measure in 2008 GDP (at market price) terms. The solid
black line represents the yearly cost in nominal terms while the broken red line represents the long-term
interest rate. For convenience, only six countries have been plotted. Readers interested in other countries
in our sample should refer to the online appendix at the author’s website.
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Figure 6: Total government liability vs long term interest rate for selected countries - 2007:2016
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(f) United Kingdom
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The red line represents the total government liability (gross debt plus contingent guarantees) as % of GDP
while the blue line represents the long term interest rate. For convenience, only six countries have been
plotted. Readers interested in other countries in our sample should refer to the online appendix at the
author’s website.
the yearly evolution of DirectAssistance measure for individual countries across time.
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Table 5: Direct assistance
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 0.00 0.31 7.93 7.50 6.57 5.91 5.09 8.43 10.81 9.55
Belgium 0.00 6.09 6.14 5.76 6.81 6.15 4.35 4.30 3.54 3.36
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.81 2.40 0.56
Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.38 0.38
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.69 10.95 13.38 9.44 9.24
Denmark 0.00 0.24 4.35 3.89 3.11 2.51 2.27 0.41 0.13 0.12
France 0.00 0.57 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Germany 0.00 2.04 3.85 11.88 10.82 10.70 8.80 8.14 7.38 7.20
Greece 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.52 2.47 19.15 24.66 23.00 25.43 24.31
Hungary 0.00 0.00 1.80 1.02 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 6.33 27.84 48.68 46.59 40.10 31.28 22.90 21.19
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.09 0.17
Latvia 0.00 3.93 5.95 9.67 7.11 6.14 5.65 5.62 4.96 4.73
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 2.77 2.08 2.39 0.92 0.25 0.18
Luxembourg 0.00 6.56 6.76 6.22 5.79 5.67 5.38 5.00 4.80 4.72
Netherlands 0.00 12.77 9.40 8.37 6.92 6.41 6.71 5.55 4.36 3.21
Portugal 0.09 0.31 0.88 3.56 4.12 8.74 8.97 9.77 11.45 11.30
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 3.94 3.90 4.59 5.00 14.22 17.71 16.76 15.83
Spain 0.00 0.84 1.73 2.26 1.99 4.83 4.93 4.80 4.66 4.61
Sweden 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 0.00 4.04 7.38 11.18 9.84 8.91 7.71 6.80 5.02 4.42
As can be seen, the central euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands) together with the UK intervened massively in the financial sector at the
beginning of the crisis. On average, more than 6% of their GDP was used to stabilize
their financial sector in 2008. In 2009, more countries intervened and the total support
increased for almost all countries. The Netherlands, Austria and Ireland topped the chart
with interventions between 6 and 10% of their GDP. 2010 was the worst year for UK and
Germany when the direct assistance reached more than 10% of their GDP. For Ireland, 2010
saw the interventions increasing multi-fold to 27.84% of GDP. In Ireland it increased further
over the years though it continued to subside for the rest of the euro area central countries.
For peripheral euro area countries, 2012 saw a sudden increase in their interventions when
the focus started shifting from global financial crisis towards the sustainability of sovereign
debt. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and Spain intervened with 9.69%, 19.15%, 8.74% and 4.83%
of their 2012 GDP respectively to support their fragile financial institutions. These support
measures have reached new heights over the years 2013-14. Most of these interventions are
still in place at the time of writing.
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3.2.2. Contingent guarantees (ContingentGuarantee)
Contingent guarantees measure the guarantees granted by the general government to
non-general government units which include the liquidity schemes and special purpose en-
tities. The value includes active guarantees and does not include the announced ceilings
for schemes. They also include guarantees on assets, whereby the government would incur
liability in case of a call. Table 6 shows the contingent liabilities provided by the individ-
ual governments to support their financial institutions. These are not part of the current
government debt but may contribute in the future. With regard to the coverage of data on
contingent liabilities, it is important to note that general government guarantees on bank
deposits are not included here, and nor are the central bank liquidity measures adopted
during the financial crisis.
Table 6: Contingent guarantees
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Austria 0.00 2.38 5.75 5.28 3.24 2.00 0.97 0.03 0.49 0.48
Belgium 0.00 10.23 17.79 15.29 12.39 15.24 11.56 9.38 7.68 8.68
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Croatia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 11.94 15.35 14.03 5.13 5.51 5.68 5.64 0.00
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.00
Denmark 0.00 0.00 3.09 11.18 9.00 3.73 0.49 0.26 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 0.00 1.96 5.16 4.52 3.41 2.42 3.25 2.20 1.83 1.98
Germany 0.00 2.59 6.46 3.21 2.29 1.82 1.30 0.76 0.73 0.57
Greece 0.00 0.78 2.36 24.7 32.75 28.3 28.31 28.61 25.37 2.23
Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 187.65 165.3 93.67 79.91 65.07 30.34 12.25 4.31 1.44
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67 5.31 5.09 1.44 0.39 0.38
Latvia 0.00 0.00 3.55 2 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 0.00 4.66 4.09 3.32 3.19 5.01 4.86 4.38 3.53 4.04
Netherlands 0.00 0.43 12.87 6.33 5.31 2.82 1.66 0.00 0.00 0.00
Portugal 0.00 0.98 4.76 2.93 9 9.81 9.56 3.64 3.50 2.48
Slovenia 0.00 0.00 5.53 6.07 4.21 0.55 1.10 0.32 0.00 0.00
Spain 0.00 0.00 4.54 5.51 6.04 10.11 9.32 5.31 4.29 3.81
Sweden 0.00 4.37 8.23 5.01 2.48 0.82 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 1.75 19.69 36.04 23.14 10.29 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
As can be seen (Table 6), the contingent liabilities increased significantly in 2008 and
2009, before decreasing gradually in 2010 and 2011. This decrease mainly reflected reduced
government exposure to guarantee schemes in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the
UK. In 2012 we see new guarantees issued to financial institutions in Spain and Italy, while
there was a decrease in contingent liabilities in several other euro area countries, mainly
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Ireland, France, and the Netherlands. In 2014, there were reductions in the amounts of
guarantees in a number of countries, notably Ireland, Spain, and Italy. In 2015 and 2016,
the decreasing trend continued due to reductions in the level of contingent liabilities mainly
in Belgium, Germany (only 2016), Ireland and Italy.
Over 2007-16 the highest levels of contingent liabilities in relation to GDP were seen in
Ireland. The peak was observed in 2008 as roughly 188% of GDP. Seven members states
(Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and the UK) reported signifi-
cant levels of contingent liabilities over the same period, ranging from 10% to about 37% of
GDP. In 2016, in all EU Member States, the level of contingent liabilities has fallen below
2.5% of GDP.
Table 7 shows the episodes in which we observe the highest levels of sovereign guarantees
together with the current state of these guarantees. For example, the average contingent
liability provided by the Greek government is 17.36 percent of Greek GDP with a standard
deviation of 13.97 percent. The highest contingent guarantee 32.75% of GDP was in the year
2011, followed by 28.72% in 2014. The first intervention was made in 2008 and continues
even today, though the amount has fallen to 2.21% of GDP.
Table 7: Summary statistics: Contingent liabilities as percentage of GDP (2007:2016)
Country Average SD Maximum (Year) 2nd Highest (Year) 3rd Highest (Year) Start Year End Year
Greece 17.36 13.97 32.75 (2011) 28.72 (2014) 28.31 (2013) 2008 Not yet
Ireland 63.99 68.37 187.65 (2008) 165.30 (2009) 93.67 (2010) 2008 Not yet
Italy 1.53 2.11 5.31 (2012) 5.09 (2013) 2.67 (2011) 2011 Not yet
Portugal 4.67 3.57 9.81 (2012) 9.56 (2013) 9.00 (2011) 2008 Not yet
Spain 4.89 3.30 10.11 (2012) 9.32 (2013) 6.04 (2011) 2009 Not yet
Austria 2.06 2.11 5.75 (2009) 5.28 (2010) 3.24 (2011) 2008 Not yet
Belgium 10.83 5.00 17.79 (2009) 15.29 (2010) 15.24 (2012) 2008 Not yet
Finland 0.01 0.02 0.06 (2008) 0.00 (2007) 0.00 (2007) 2008 2008
France 2.67 1.48 5.16 (2009) 4.52 (2010) 3.41 (2011) 2008 Not yet
Germany 1.97 1.87 6.46 (2009) 3.21 (2010) 2.59 (2008) 2008 Not yet
Luxembourg 3.71 1.45 5.01 (2012) 4.86 (2013) 4.66 (2008) 2008 Not yet
Netherlands 2.94 4.19 12.87 (2009) 6.33 (2010) 5.31 (2011) 2008 2013
Cyprus 6.33 5.73 15.35 (2010) 14.03 (2011) 11.94 (2009) 2009 2015
Latvia 0.73 1.17 3.54 (2009) 2.00 (2010) 0.63 (2011) 2009 2013
Czech Republic 0.02 0.03 0.09 (2013) 0.05 (2014) 0.01 (2015) 2013 2015
Slovenia 1.78 2.48 6.07 (2010) 5.53 (2009) 4.21 (2011) 2009 2014
Denmark 2.78 4.12 11.17 (2010) 9.02 (2011) 3.72 (2012) 2009 2014
Sweden 2.13 2.94 8.53 (2009) 5.33 (2010) 3.87 (2008) 2008 2014
United Kingdom 8.85 12.67 36.15 (2009) 23.06 (2010) 16.46 (2008) 2007 2012
Note: In countries which are part of EU28 but are not mentioned here, no contingent liability was reported
by the government.
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3.3. Government liability excluding the financial assistance (GovLiabExclFinAsst)
GovLiabExclFinAsst is calculated as the difference between the gross consolidated debt
of the general government and liabilities arising out of direct assistance to support financial
institutions. We can think of it as the current fiscal stance of a country net of the additional
liabilities coming from the financial sector support measures. Note that it excludes the direct
bailout cost arising from the direct assistance in the previous periods. However, it includes
the financing cost arising due to direct assistance up until now. It also includes the cost
net of guarantee fees due to contingent guarantees and the resulting financing cost due to
increased deficit.10
GovLiabExclFinAsst includes not just the above-mentioned cost but also two additional
losses. The first is the direct revenue losses which are due to the effect of financial crises on
the country’s tax system. The downward change in asset prices driven by financial instability
lowers the direct taxes paid by households on wealth, direct taxes paid by corporations on
assets and sales taxes. A reduction in real estate transactions (in price and volume), the
slowdown of equity markets, decreases in dividends or the emergence of other depreciated
assets all have a negative impact on fiscal revenues due to various tax rules.
Secondly, financial turmoil affects fiscal accounts indirectly through its impact on the
real economy. Lower salaries and higher unemployment trigger a reduction in personal
income tax and in social contributions but an increase in unemployment benefits. The
negative wealth effect generated by the depreciation of financial and non-financial assets
curbs consumption and investment. It thus reduces indirect tax revenues. Moreover, tighter
credit conditions would further exacerbate this decrease. Finally, the subsequent increase
in government debt would, in turn, affect the fiscal deficit via higher interest payments (for
more detail, refer to Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002), Maurer and Grussenmeyer (2015)).
All in all, this variable must be interpreted with caution as it incorporates both - the primary
and second-round effect of financial crises.
All other variables used in the empirical analysis are explained in detail in Appendix B.
An overview of variable definitions and data sources is provided in Table 8, while Table B.1
shows the summary statistics.
10These detailed distinctions are important but are not relevant for our analysis, since we are not interested
in estimating the fiscal cost related to financial crises.
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Table 8: Variable list
Variable Name Description Frequency Unit Source
Sovereign risk measure
SovYield Sovereign’s long term interest rate as used in Maastricht convergence criteria. Annual Percentage Eurostat
Government support measures
DirectAssistance Increase in the general government liabilities due of direct assistance. Annual % of GDP Eurostat
ContingentGuarantee Contingent guarantees provided by the general government. Annual % of GDP Eurostat
Financial institutions characteristics
SizeFI Size of the financial institutions relative to GDP. Annual SDW, ECB
ShareTop5CI Share of top 5 domestic credit institutions (CIs) in total CIs assets . Annual SDW, ECB
HI Herfindal index as a measure of asset concentration among domestic credit insti-
tutions.
Annual SDW, ECB
Country characteristics
GDP Gross domestic product. Annual in Euro million Eurostat
Inflation Annual inflation Annual in % Eurostat
Unemployment Unemployment rate Annual in % Eurostat
GovDebt Government consolidated gross debt. Annual in Euro million Eurostat
GovLiabExclFinAsst Ratio of the difference between the government consolidated gross debt and lia-
bilities arising from the government intervention to support financial institutions
and GDP
Annual Percentage Eurostat
Institutional quality
GovEff Indicator of a country’s perceived government effectiveness. Annual World Bank - WGI
Uncertainty measures
WUI The World Uncertainty Index Annual average www.policyuncertainty.com
ESI The Economic Sentiment Indicator Annual average DG ECFIN
Dummy variables
EUROAREA A dummy variable that is one for euro area countries (EA-19) and zero otherwise.
GIIPS A dummy variable that is one for Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, and
zero otherwise.
4. Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis starts by exploring whether there is a significant relationship
between sovereign risk and financial support measure for our sample of countries. The
analysis then explores the potential drivers of this relation.
4.1. Financial assistance and sovereign risk
Our first hypothesis addresses the general relationship between government intervention
and sovereign yield. To that end, we run the following regression:
SovY ieldi,t = β0 + β1 DirectAssistancei,t + i,t (1)
where SovY ieldi,t represents the 10-year benchmark government bond yield for country i at
time t, DirAssti,t represents the direct assistance provided by country i to their financial
sector at time t and i,t the error term. The coefficient of interest is β1, which shows the
change in sovereign yield when direct assistance is increased by 1% of GDP, and we expect
it to be positive and significant.
We run a similar regression specification for contingent guarantee to test the hypothesis
that the relationship between contingent guarantee and sovereign risk is also positive and
significant. Our regression model is as follows:
SovY ieldi,t = β0 + β1 ContingentGuaranteei,t + i,t (2)
where SovY ieldi,t represents the 10-year benchmark government bond yield for country i
at time t, ContingentGuaranteei,t represents the contingent guarantees provided by country
i to their financial sector at time t and i,t the error term. The coefficient of interest β1,
which shows the change in sovereign yield when contingent assistance is increased by 1% of
GDP.
Table 9 shows the regression results with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Government interventions to support financial institutions clearly have an effect on the
sovereign’s creditworthiness. The significant positive coefficient of 0.06 and 0.029 implies
that an additional percentage of GDP used to support financial institutions will increase the
sovereign risk by 6 and 2.9 basis points depending on whether we are speaking of direct or
contingent assistance. As can be noted, the deleterious effect of the contingent guarantee is
roughly half of the effect of direct assistance.
4.2. Baseline results
To take stock of the government’s existing debt, we modify the previous regression spec-
ification by adding the gross stock of debt which is not part of the direct intervention of
government’s support program (GovLiabExclF inAsst) together with the flow variables (di-
rect assistance and contingent guarantees). To control for the different time period and its
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Table 9: Ordinary least square regression results
Dependent variable: SovYield
(1) (2)
DirectAssistance 0.060∗∗
(0.024)
ContingentGuarantee 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009)
Constant 3.679∗∗∗ 3.777∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.185)
Observations 230 230
R2 0.026 0.041
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.037
Residual Std. Error (df = 228) 2.703 2.683
F Statistic (df = 1; 228) 6.096∗∗ 9.732∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
effect on sovereign risk, we also add the year fixed effects. We run the following econometric
specification:
SovY ieldi,t =β1 GovLiabExclF inAssti,t
+ β2DirectAssistancei,t + β3 ContingentGuaranteei,t
+ θt + i,t
(3)
where θt captures the year fixed effect. SovY ieldi,t represents the long term interest rate,
GovLiabExclF inAssti,t is the gross consolidated government debt net of liability arising
from government intervention (as % of GDP), DirectAssistancei,t is the liability (as %
of GDP) arising from direct interventions and ContingentGuaranteei,t is the contingent
guarantees (as % of GDP) of country i at time t. i,t represents the error term. We cluster
the standard errors at country level to allow for correlation of error terms within countries.
The coefficient of interest are β1, β2 and β3.
We consider three basic panel regression methods: the Pooled-OLS method, the fixed-
effects (FE) method and the random effects (RE) model. Table 10 shows the regression
results with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Note that the coefficient shows the
change in the sovereign’s long-term interest rate when the level of government support goes
up by one percent of GDP. In order to determine the empirical relevance of each of the
potential methods for our panel data, we use several statistic tests. In particular, we test
FE versus RE using the Hausman test statistic to test for non-correlation between the
unobserved effect and the regressors (see Baltagi (2005), p. 66). To choose between pooled-
OLS and RE, we use Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s Lagrange multiplier test to test for the
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presence of an unobserved effect. Finally, we use the F test for fixed effects to test whether
all unobservable individual effects are zero, in order to discriminate between pooled-OLS
and RE. The results of these tests, (not show here to save space, but available from the
authors upon request) show that the FE model is the relevant one in our case.
Table 10: Regression results: All components of government liability
Dependent variable: SovYield
Pooled OLS FE RE
(1) (2) (3)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.017∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.022
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
DirectAssistance 0.019 0.065∗ 0.042
(0.029) (0.035) (0.030)
ContingentGuarantee 0.023∗∗ 0.003 0.013∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 2.669∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.891)
Year FE Yes
Observations 230 230 230
R2 0.088 0.195 0.128
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.151 0.117
F Statistic 7.305∗∗∗ (df = 3; 226) 17.570∗∗∗ (df = 3; 217) 33.294∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
As can be seen, both stock and flow variables have a significant effect on sovereign yield
although the magnitude differs considerably. The effect of contingent guarantee becomes in-
significant while that of other government liabilities and direct assistance become significant.
The effect of direct assistance is also more than twice that of other government liabilities.
Time dummies are also important and the estimated coefficient change significantly. The
explanatory power of the regression doubles in the case of FE and multiplies by 1.6 in the
case of RE relative to the regression with the same controls, but without time dummies.
Figure 7 plots the year dummy coefficients. As can be seen, the estimation identifies a gen-
eral decline in the sovereign yield over the sample, that is intensified in December 2011 and
February 2012 when two 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) were made
available by the ECB to the banks.
5. Robustness
In this Section, we examined several robustness exercises. In particular, we assess
whether the results are robust to different subsamples of countries, to the size and asset
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Figure 7: Time varying coefficient
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concentration in the financial sector, to the country characteristics and to uncertainty and
market sentiment indicators. Going forward, all regression results show heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors.
5.1. Effect of sample composition
To control for the exogenous membership of different groups and understand the influence
of a particular group, we subset our sample of countries in six different groups: (1) Full
sample; (2) Non-euro area; (3) Euro area; (4) Euro area founders (EA12);11 (5) Central
EA12 countries; and (6) Peripheral EA12 countries. We run the following regression model
while controlling for different groups.
SovY ieldi,t =β1 GovLiabExclF inAssti,t
+ β2DirectAssistancei,t + β3 ContingentGuaranteei,t
+ θt + dmemeber=1 + i,t
(4)
11EA12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands. Central and peripheral countries are listed in Table 3.
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where the previous regression is extended by dummy variables d which takes value 1 if the
country i belongs to a particular group.12
As can be seen (Table 11), the estimated effect of GovLiabExclFinAsst (our proxy of the
fiscal stance of a country net of the additional liabilities coming from the financial sector
support measures) is higher and highly significant for EA12 and peripheral countries with
respect to the baseline regression results. Regarding the impact of the direct assistance, the
results are much stronger for the Euro, EA12 and peripheral countries, but are negative for
non-euro and central countries (although in the latter case it is statistically insignificant).
As for the effect of contingent guarantee, it becomes statistically significant for the EA12,
core and peripheral countries, and is higher in the case of the core countries.
Table 11: Effect of government liability on sovereign risk based on exogenous subset of countries
Dependent variable: SovYield
(All) (Euro) (Non-euro) (EA12) (Central) (Peripheral)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.027∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.046∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.001 0.064∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.001) (0.017)
DirectAssistance 0.065∗ 0.092∗∗ −0.262∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ −0.018 0.080∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.124) (0.034) (0.015) (0.047)
ContingentGuarantee 0.003 0.005 −0.067 0.014∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.055) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 160 70 120 70 50
R2 0.195 0.241 0.476 0.467 0.333 0.446
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.180 0.366 0.407 0.192 0.266
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notably, the sovereign risk is positively correlated with direct assistance in euro-area
countries, while it is negatively correlated for non-euro countries. Increase in direct assistance
by one percentage of GDP will lower the sovereign’s long term borrowing cost by roughly
26 basis points for non-euro countries, but will increase the borrowing cost for euro area
countries by nice basis points. This suggests that for the non-euro country, an increase in
direct assistance reduces the risk of sovereign default. The effect is also three times larger
than for euro area countries. This is interesting, as it highlights the challenges in fiscal
consolidation for countries which are part of the monetary union.
5.2. Effect of size and asset concentration in financial sector
The debate about the financial sector regulations considers banks assets in proportion
to GDP and the asset concentration within the financial sector as the key determinant of a
country’s ability to bail out its financial institutions. Thus, the presence of too many too-
big-to-fail institutions or extreme concentration of assets restricts a sovereign’s ability. We
12Although we run the Pooled OLS, FE and FE models, in Tables 11 to 15 we report only the results
obtained using the FE model since this is the most appropriate in all cases.
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are particularly interested in assessing whether the relation between financial support and
sovereign risk is stronger for countries with a large dependence on the financial sector and
whether the relationship between financial support and sovereign risk is weaker for countries
with a large concentration of assets in the financial sector. To that end, we use the following
regression model:
SovY ieldi,t =β0 + β1 GovLiabExclF inAssti,t
+ β2 DirectAssistancei,t + β3 ContingentGuaranteei,t
+ γ1 SizeFIi,t + γ1 ShareTop5FIi,t + θt + i,t
(5)
where the size of domestic financial institutions relative to GDP (SizeFI) is now included
together with the asset concentration in the top five financial institutions (ShareTop5CI).
All other variables are defined as in the previous regressions.
Table 12: Results: Effect of financial sector
Dependent variable: SovYield
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.027∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
DirectAssistance 0.065∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.031)
ContingentGuarantee 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
SizeFI −0.661∗∗∗ −0.687∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.185)
ShareTop5CI 0.038∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.018) (0.015)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 212 219 207
R2 0.195 0.328 0.274 0.393
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.284 0.228 0.349
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 12 shows the results when year fixed effects are included. As can be seen, we
find negative and positive significant coefficients for SizeFI and ShareTop5CI respectively.
These results suggest that, controlling for government interventions, higher dependence on
the financial sector negatively influences the sovereign risk, while asset concentration in
financial sector has a positive impact on the sovereign risk. When we run regression sub-
stituting ShareTop5CI with the Herfindahl index (HI), the effect vanishes. The results
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suggest that countries where financial institutions had bigger assets, offered a lower cost of
borrowing to the sovereign and were more resilient in the current crisis. Note that the effect
of direct assistance is consistently significant and is within a narrow range for the different
specification. Contingent guarantees, on the other hand, had no significant effect on the
sovereign’s borrowing conditions or funding costs.
5.3. Effect of country characteristics
Several different country characteristics may be drivers of the sovereign-bank nexus (see
Attinasi et al. (2009)). First, we consider the size of a country (proxied by GDP), which is
linked with its relative importance in the global market. Second, in view of Mody (2009)’s
argument that countries’ sensitivity to the financial crisis is more pronounced the greater
the loss of their growth potential and competitiveness, we include instruments that measure
these features. The unemployment rate is the variable used to capture the country’s growth
potential, whilst the inflation rate is used as a proxy of the appreciation of the real exchange
rate and, thus, the country’s loss of competitiveness. An increase in either unemployment
or inflation represents a deterioration of growth potential and competitiveness; therefore, it
should augment sovereign yield.
Finally, we consider a country’s perceived governance quality, as reflected in the gov-
ernment effectiveness indicator provided by the World Bank. Investigating this indicator
captures the idea that country governance may be related to government actions during the
financial crisis (see Schnabel and Schu¨wer (2016)), and therefore affect the government’s
ability to intervene. To examine whether the relation between government support and
sovereign risk is modified by the country characteristics, our regression model takes the
following form:
SovY ieldi,t =β0 + β1 GovLiabExclF inAssti,t
+ β2 DirectAssistancei,t + β3 ContingentGuaranteei,t
+ γ1 ln(GDPi,t) + γ2 Inflationi,t + γ3 Unemploymenti,t
+ γ4 GovEffi,t + θt + i,t
(6)
where GDPi,t and GovEffi,t stand for Gross Domestic Product and perceived government
effectiveness of country i in period t. All other variables are defined as in the previous
regressions.
Table 13 shows the coefficient with the year fixed effects. As can be seen, the estimated
coefficient for log(GDP) is negative and highly significant suggesting that an increase in
aggregate economic activity reduces sovereign yields. The inclusion of log(GDP) reduces the
effect of the direct assistance and marginally raises the effect of the contingent guarantee.
As regards inflation, as expected we obtain a positive and highly significant coefficient.
The remaining results are very similar to the main specification. When controlling for
unemployment, as expected we obtain a positive and highly significant coefficient for this
variable, while the rest of the variables become statistically insignificant. Turning to the case
of the role of perceived government effectiveness, we obtain a negative and highly significant
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impact of this variable on sovereign yield and a significant increase of the estimated effect of
the direct assistance, and a marginal rise in the estimated effect of the contingent guarantee.
Finally, controlling together for the four country characteristics, we obtain a similar effect
for the contingent guarantee and a reduction of the estimated effect of the direct assistance
with respect to the baseline specification.
Table 13: Effect of macroeconomic variables
Dependent variable: SovYield
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.027∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.012 0.017∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
DirectAssistance 0.065∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.038 0.080∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024) (0.027) (0.014)
ContingentGuarantee 0.003 0.004 0.007 −0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
log(GDP) −0.907∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.109)
Inflation 0.255∗∗∗ 0.121∗
(0.094) (0.067)
Unemployment 0.287∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.064)
Government Effectiveness −2.153∗∗∗ −0.754∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.254)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 230 230 230 230 230
R2 0.195 0.464 0.220 0.445 0.437 0.607
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.432 0.173 0.412 0.403 0.577
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In summary, in line with our expectations, we find a significant negative relationship
between country GDP and sovereign yield. We also found that an increase in either unem-
ployment or inflation - a deterioration of growth potential and competitiveness - increases
the sovereign yield. The effect is far stronger for the case of unemployment than for infla-
tion. The effect of government effectiveness is significantly negative, which means that the
sovereign risk is lower for countries with high perceived government effectiveness.
5.4. Effect of uncertainty and market sentiment
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe has attributed increasing importance to uncertainty
and to variables reflecting investment confidence conditions and perceptions for the upcom-
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ing economic activity (see, e.g. Georgoutsos and Migiakis (2013)). To evaluate the effect of
such variables, we use World Uncertainty Index (WUI) and Economic Sentiment Indicators
(ESI). The WUI is an index of economic uncertainty for 143 countries constructed using
frequency counts of “uncertainty” (and its variants) in the quarterly Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) country reports.13 As increased uncertainty is usually accompanied by an in-
crease in risk components and, thus, leads to increases in bond yields, we expect a positive
sign for the respective coefficient. As for the ESI, it is a composite indicator published by
Eurostat and is usually employed to gauge economic agents’ perceptions of future economic
activity. It seems reasonable to expect it will have a negative relationship with yields, since
increase in the ESI may lead to a rise in investor confidence in the economy’s potential for
growth.14
Table 14: The role of macroeconomic uncertainty
Dependent variable: SovYield
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.027∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.021∗ 0.017
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
DirectAssistance 0.065∗ 0.062∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
ContingentGuarantee 0.003 0.004 −0.008 −0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
WUI −0.043 −0.734
(1.649) (1.436)
ESI −0.144∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.052)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 210 230 210
R2 0.195 0.173 0.303 0.292
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.118 0.262 0.241
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 14 shows the regression result. All specifications contain year fixed effects. When
controlling for economic uncertainty we obtain a negative, not statistically significant coeffi-
cient, while the remaining results are very similar to the main specification. Regarding ESI,
13http://www.policyuncertainty.com/wui quarterly.html
14Furthermore, results in Laborda and Olmo (2014) suggest that market sentiment helps to explain sys-
tematic deviations in bond prices that are related to waves of market sentiment such as the flight-to-quality
phenomenon between stocks and bonds.
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we obtain as expected a negative and highly significant coefficient for this variable, while
the rest of variables become statistically insignificant; there is a significant increase of the
estimated effect of the direct assistance and a change of sign in the estimated effect of the
contingent guarantee, the latter not being statistically significant. Finally, when controlling
for both uncertainty variables together, we obtain an increase in the positive and statistically
significant estimated effect of the direct assistance and a negative and insignificant effect for
the contingent guarantee with respect to the baseline specification.
As can be seen, the effect of direct assistance is consistently significant and is within a
narrow range for the different specification. On the other hand, contingent guarantees are
consistently insignificant. The coefficient of uncertainty indicator is insignificant while the
economic sentiment is significantly negative. These results give robust evidence of the effect
of direct assistance on the sovereign’s yield. They also suggest that the market perception
of future economic activities strongly influences the sovereign’s current borrowing prospects.
5.5. Combined analysis
So far, we have tested the effect of different potential drivers of the sovereign risk in
separate regressions. Next, we run analyses where measures for financial sector character-
istics and country characteristics are used jointly as explanatory variables. Since the euro
area members have significantly different institutional structures, we explore this further by
extending the regression specification by the dummy variables euroi. The variable euro has
a value of 1 for all euro area countries and zero otherwise.
Summing up (Table 15), several coefficients become less significant or insignificant for
the combined analysis relative to our previous results. Due to multicollinearity, this is not
unexpected. However, for the remaining, the coefficients point toward the same relations
identified before. In particular, the results of this combined analysis are consistent with our
results: (1) An additional percentage of GDP in direct assistance increases the sovereign
yield by 6.2 basis points; (2) An additional percentage of GDP as contingent guarantee
has no significant effect on sovereign yield; (3) Size of the country, perceived government
effectiveness and better economic sentiments negatively affect the sovereign yield; (4) Rising
unemployment, rising inflation, and increasing uncertainty positively affect sovereign yield;
and (5) Membership of the euro area lowers the sovereign yield by roughly 85 basis points.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effect of government interventions to support financial
institutions on the sovereign risk profile. To this end, we classify all government interventions
into two broad categories: (1) Direct assistance, which increase the government’s financing
need immediately; and (2) Contingent guarantees, which have no direct impact immediately
but increase the funding requirement as and when loss materializes.
Our findings suggest that even though both forms of financial assistance are temporary
in nature, direct assistance is significantly more expensive. This is so because the provision
of direct assistance requires immediate disbursement of the resources available to the govern-
ment, which in turn are determined by the sovereign’s current risk profile. In times of crisis,
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Table 15: Regression results: Combined analysis
Dependent variable: SovYield
(1) (2) (3)
GovLiabExclFinAsst 0.027∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
DirectAssistance 0.065∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.016) (0.015)
ContingentGuarantee 0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
SizeFI −0.008 −0.077
(0.134) (0.138)
ShareTop5CI 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.007)
log(GDP) −0.588∗∗∗ −0.548∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.184)
Inflation 0.119∗ 0.123∗
(0.062) (0.066)
Unemployment 0.139∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.050)
Government Effectiveness −0.891∗∗∗ −0.701∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.219)
WUI 2.194∗∗ 1.353∗
(0.855) (0.767)
ESI −0.088∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.034)
EUROAREA −0.853∗∗
(0.335)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 230 194 194
R2 0.195 0.658 0.675
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.618 0.635
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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if a large amount needs to be transferred to the banking sector and the government’s fiscal
space is limited, direct intervention will have a direct detrimental effect on the sovereign’s
solvency and will increase its funding costs. We also found that the contingent guarantee
does not affect significantly the sovereign risk, possibly because contingent guarantees (1) do
not increase the funding requirement immediately, and (2) indirectly influence both banking
and sovereign risk; since the likelihood of a banking crisis and that of a sovereign default
affect one another, the resulting gain might offset the increased cost (see Leonello (2017)).
Overall, the analysis suggests that policies addressing the design of financial intervention
schemes and their funding are important for limiting the sovereign’s own fragility (see Bova
et al. (2016)). Since the government’s budget is limited, and both the banks and the gov-
ernment are fragile, it is of utmost importance to address the financial assistance design and
its funding while limiting the impact on the sovereign’s own risk. It also provides support
to the argument that the credibility and effectiveness of the guarantees are intertwined with
the sovereign funding risk (see Ko¨nig et al. (2014), Leonello (2017)).
This paper could be extended in a number of interesting directions. At this stage, we
assume that direct assistance and contingent guarantees are interchangeable. This assump-
tion may not be justified. In the future, we hope to be able to understand the compo-
nents of financial interventions that cannot be interchanged, and thus have more precise
estimates. Another possible extension would be to consider the role of a supranational au-
thority providing the guarantees instead of the national government. This analysis might
provide some interesting insights into the introduction of pan-European insurance or bank
resolution schemes. Finally, we would like to understand the potential distortions in bank’s
behavior associated with different interventions.
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Appendix A. Financial interventions and their classification
I accordance with the European Commission’s Excessive Deficit Procedure guidelines,
the various European countries have published data on government interventions carried
out by public authorities to support the financial sector. Since 2009 Eurostat has regularly
collected and published this data for EU member states. This section discusses the various
interventions in detail and analyzes their effect on the government’s immediate financing
requirement. We classify them into two broad categories: (1) Direct assistance - support
measures that increase the government’s financing requirement immediately; and (2) Con-
tingent guarantees - support that will increase the financing requirement over time, as and
when the loss materializes.15
1. Capital injection to support financial institutions: These are capital transfers
to cover current or expected losses (or repetitive losses). Usually, they are large, infrequent
and something-for-nothing transfers of wealth from governments to a public or private insti-
tution. The government receives no income in return for these transactions (i.e. ia,t = 0 ∀ t).
Thus they increase the sovereign financing need immediately, and we classify them here as
direct assistance.
2. Acquisition or purchase of equities or other debt securities (at or above the
market price): These also work as capital transfers; however, in these financial transactions,
the government receives a financial asset in return for providing funds. Thus it implies
a change in the government’s assets as well as a change in liabilities. These assets later
become a source of indirect revenue via dividends (for equity) and interest receivable (for
loans and other debt securities). The purchase of these financial instruments increases
the government’s financing requirement immediately (hence, they are classified as direct
assistance for our purpose) though a large amount can be recovered by the future sale of
these securities. Note that the net cost of these acquisitions is not just the capital transfer
resulting from the difference between the market value and the price paid during acquisition.
If the government needs to issue new debt to finance these transactions, the government has
to pay an interest cost on these borrowings until these assets are sold and loans are repaid.
3. Provision of loans: These are direct lending to financial institutions and hence
are classified as targeted intervention for our purpose. If there is a written or irrefutable
evidence that the loan or a part of it will not be paid, then it is considered as a capital
transfer. Any subsequent cancellation or forgiveness of loans are recorded as capital transfer
in the subsequent period as and when it happens.
4. Debt assumption: This is a special form of debt refinancing, involving three parties -
15We use the work financing and borrowing in a different context here. If the financing requirement for
governments goes up, the government can pay this amount by using different means one of which is by
raising money in the capital markets via issuing new debt security. Thus not all financing requirements may
result in direct borrowing.
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the creditor, the original debtor, and a new debtor, where the new debtor assumes the debt
obligation by replacing the old debtor. This involves two simultaneous transactions - the first
transaction cancels the original debtor’s obligation, and the second transaction creates a new
debt contract between the creditor and the new debtor. The first transaction is classified as
a capital transfer (as in the case of debt forgiveness), and the second transaction involves
the creditor’s acquisition of the new debt instrument issued by the assumer.16 Thus this also
raises immediate financing needs for the governments though the schedule of obligations will
be dictated by the original debt contract.17
5. Defeasance structures: These are entities incorporated as a special entity by
the government to address specific aspects of the turmoil. In general, the entity acquires
nonperforming assets from the financial institutions at equal or above the market price
(capital transfer) and so raises the need for immediate financing. It usually has no autonomy
and its sole purpose is to conduct specific objectives set by the owner. These defeasance
bodies can also transfer an additional burden on the sovereign’s balance sheet if assets
continue to underperform. Since the government will be responsible for all future liabilities,
it can create additional financing needs. Assets and liabilities of other entities which are
reclassified from the financial sector to the general government do not add to the financing
burden immediately, though usually they are created with government support to start
with. It should be remembered that in the case of government-owned defeasance bodies,
the proceeds from the future sale of assets can offset the fiscal costs related to government
interventions.
6. Guarantee on assets or liabilities outside general government: These are
guarantees which provide assurances to the creditor that, should a debtor (here the financial
institutions) be unable to meet its liability, the guarantor (here the government) will meet
it the debtor’s behalf. The contract usually specifies the specific conditions that must be
fulfilled before the guarantor takes responsibility. Guarantees are granted in relation to
deposits or borrowing or might be extended to the value of assets in some circumstances.
The guarantees result in no direct cost for the government unless they are called. Here we
classify them under contingent guarantee.
7. Securities issued under the liquidity scheme: These are temporary exchanges of
financial assets which are carried out by the national central banks to improve the liquidity of
financial institutions within the euro area. These are securities lending operations in which
governments exchange government securities with private banks based on collateral in the
form of discounted asset back securities or covered bonds. The transactions are recorded as
back-to-back repurchase agreements rather than as securities lent by the government so that
the economic ownership still rests with the government. These are short duration contracts
with the risk of loss expected to be very small (Maurer and Grussenmeyer (2015)). As
16OECD: Glossary of statistical terms
17The debt contract can also be modified at the time of transaction based on mutually agreed terms.
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the assets are government owned, the ultimate liability lies with the government in case of
default. So we classify them as contingent guarantees of the government.
8. Guarantee on Special purpose entities: Any other additional guarantee granted
to public or private institutions or special purpose entities not yet covered are classified under
this category. We classify them under the contingent guarantee for our current purposes.
Appendix B. Other variables
Appendix B.1. Country level financial sector characteristic
The financial sector characteristics data are from banking Structural Financial Indicators
(SSIs) which are collected annually by the ECB as part of its supervisory and prudential
statistics (Source). Economic dependence on financial institutions is proxied by the total
domestic assets of all credit institutions (SizeFI) as a multiple of GDP. To measure asset
concentration, we use two different measures:
1. Shares of the 5 largest credit institutions (CIs) in total CI assets (ShareTop5CI )
2. Herfindahl index for credit institutions (HI ) is obtained by summing the squares of
the market shares of all the credit institutions in the banking sector
HI =
n∑
i=1
(
Xi
X
)2
where, n is the total number of CIs in the country, Xi is the total assets of CI i and
X =
∑n
i=1Xi is the total assets of all CIs in the country.
Figure B1 plots the average shares of the top 5 largest credit institutions for our sample
countries between 2007 and 2016.
Appendix B.2. Country governance indicators
Data on a country’s perceived government effectiveness are included in the analysis to
account for country characteristics that may affect the sovereign’s bailout strategy. The data
come from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project and are provided by the World
Bank. In particular, the indicator for government effectiveness captures “perceptions of the
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” The indicator is based on
survey responses from enterprise, citizen and expert respondents and is produced by a variety
of institutes, international organizations, and private sector firms.18
The indicators are available on a yearly basis and generally range from -2.5 (weak gov-
ernance) to 2.5 (strong governance). For our sample, the government effectiveness ranges
from -0.05 (Bulgaria 2008) to 2.35 (Denmark 2007). Figure B2 illustrates the average level
of these indices for the individual countries for the period 2007-2016.
18Source: www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/. See also Kaufmann et al. (2010) for a description of
the data.
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Figure B1: Average share of the biggest five credit institution (CI) in total CIs assets
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Appendix B.3. Macroeconomic indicators
We use GDP in nominal terms (in national currency) to study the effect of country size.
We use the gross consolidated debt and debt-to-GDP ratio as the current total government
liability. The increasing debt level is the direct measure via which government interventions
are translated into potential risk for the sovereign.19Gross public debt is also the most
affected indicator and has been widely cited as the major source of weakness and concern
for the sustainability of public finances in the euro area. However, the reality was far more
complex: a close look at the government balance sheets suggests that large increases in public
debt were accompanied by the acquisition of assets in the financial sector and shifts in their
financial portfolio and cash reserve. GDP, Debt-to-GDP ratio and government consolidated
gross debt data come from Eurostat.20 We also consider inflation and unemployment rate
as a proxy for the current macroeconomic condition.
Appendix B.4. Uncertainty and market sentiment indicators
WUI: The World Uncertainty Index (WUI) is defined using the frequency of the word ‘uncer-
tainty’ in the quarterly Economist Intelligence Unit country reports. In general, WUI spikes
19Note that this does not include the contingent liability of the sovereigns.
20http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database - Database by themes - Economy and finance - Government
statistics (gov) - Government finance statistics (DP and ESA 2010) (gov gfs10) - Quarterly government
finance statistics (gov 10q) - Quarterly government debt (gov 10q ggdebt)
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Figure B2: Average level of government effectiveness as measured by the World Bank - WGI
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are more synchronized within advanced economies and between economies with tighter trade
and financial linkages. Source: www.policyuncertainty.com
ESI: The Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) is a composite indicator made up of five
sectoral confidence indicators with different weights: Industrial confidence indicator, Services
confidence indicator, Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence indicator, and
Retail trade confidence indicator. Confidence indicators are arithmetic means of seasonally
adjusted balances of answers to a selection of questions closely related to the reference
variable they are supposed to track (e.g., industrial production for the industrial confidence
indicator). Surveys are defined within the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business
and Consumer Surveys. The economic sentiment indicator (ESI) is calculated as an index
with a mean value of 100 and a standard deviation of 10 over a fixed standardized sample
period. Data are compiled according to the Statistical classification of economic activities
in the European Community. Source: DG ECFIN
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Table B.1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
SovYield 230 3.95 2.73 0.09 2.05 4.77 22.50
DirectAssistance (% of GDP) 230 4.54 7.37 0.00 0.00 6.20 49.00
ContingentGuarantee (% of GDP) 230 6.06 19.33 0.00 0.00 4.80 188
Government liability excluding financial assistance (GovLiabExclFA) 230 63.17 33.14 7.80 38.16 81.88 169.63
Size of financial sector relative to GDP (SizeFI) 212 1.93 1.34 0.03 0.64 3.11 5.76
Share of top 5 credit institution (ShareTop5CI) 219 58.26 17.01 22.00 44.46 69.47 97.28
Herfindal Index (HI) 224 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.37
Gross Domestic Product (in billion euros) 230 561.03 783.89 17.59 44.21 628.02 3,144.05
Inflation 230 1.87 2.20 −1.68 0.36 2.86 15.25
Unemployment rate 230 9.60 4.92 3.46 6.20 11.48 27.48
Governance Effectiveness (GovEff) 230 1.22 0.56 −0.05 0.71 1.64 2.35
World Uncertainty Index (WUI) 210 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.28 0.99
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) 230 97.31 9.40 72.17 91.12 104.02 117.48
 
